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CRITICAL RACE PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW SYMPOSIUM
Learning from Anthropology
Realizing a Critical Race Approach to (International) Law
Introduction
Despite anthropology’s troublesome contribution to the colonial project, the discipline as
it is today has much to offer to critical race theory (CRT) and postcolonial approaches to
international law. Already in the 1930s, Franz Boas and his students began to challenge
the Eurocentrism, modernism and colonialism of anthropology. They developed a
critique of cultural evolutionism, according to which culture was understood as evolving
towards the “Western ideal”. Instead, they acknowledged cultural diversity and
condemned colonialism.
While the Boasians’ contribution to anthropology and particularly their cultural
relativism has also attracted criticism, their work still constituted a turning point for
anthropology: anthropology turned from a discipline entrenched in the colonial
endeavour to a discipline, whose theories and methods can help to dismantle racial and
other forms of biases in the social sciences, including law. Today, anthropology’s potential
contribution to counter-hegemonic projects is widely acknowledged for several reasons:
its interdisciplinarity, its scepticism of unifying theories and its interest in the “local”, the
everyday, or the marginal. But what exactly can anthropology contribute to CRT in law?
Situating the law
Anthropology promotes a more holistic and situated understanding of law on at least two
levels:
Firstly, anthropological enquiries may include norms that may not be seen as “law” by
lawyers. Such a view challenges “legal centralism”, which sees states as the only source of
law. Instead, it recognises the de facto law-making function of a variety of different actors
such as corporations, local customary authorities, the media and international NGOs.
Critical Race Theory, amongst others, seeks to shift the focus of research from
hegemonic to marginal perspectives. Hence, acknowledging that not only the state, but
also a variety of groups within the state influence our understandings of the law, is an
important step in the right direction.
Secondly, anthropology can contribute to the critical legal project by helping to situate
the law. Anthropologists, unlike many lawyers, do not start from the assumption that the
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law is objective and can be decoupled from other forms of social practice. Instead, law is
understood as a mirror of the society with all its hegemonies and counter-hegemonic
struggles. From an anthropological perspective, analysing the law means that also its
space of origin, its practices and its relations to other forms of social practice should be
taken into consideration.
This obviously contravenes the intuition of many international lawyers. Human rights in
particular draw life from their claim to universality. Such an uncritical understanding of
human rights tends to set human rights and Western states as the norm while it reduces
the Third World to their non-compliance. Particularly, the Third World Approaches to
International Law (TWAIL), which are characterized by strong overlap with CRT, criticise
international law’s claim to universality. It is considered to be problematic for several
reasons: it ignores the colonial history of international law and contributes to discourses
that confirm Western superiority and keep the Third World in the periphery of the
transnational legal space. Besides that, it homogenizes the Third World and rejects its
agency: it does not take into consideration the myriad of processes going on within the
states of the Third World, particularly counter-hegemonic processes.
Moreover, the discourse of international law often suggests a legal hierarchy with
international law at the top of the pyramid, followed by national and sometimes sub-
national law. This devaluates not only national and local laws, it also does not grasp the
reality of legal pluralism in an accurate way. Legal pluralism, which is the focus of many
legal anthropologist enquiries, describes how different legal systems overlap and interact.
Anthropologists examine “legal and law-like orders involved in international,
transnational and global connections”.  Legal pluralism is, however, not seen as the result
of a one-way process. Instead, both processes of globalization and “glocalization” are of
interest to legal anthropologists. Glocalization describes how the “local” flows back to the
“global”. Acknowledging the complexity of such flows and their various directions allows
for the examination of heterogeneity, particularity and emerging contradictions in
different spaces. It enables us to question simplifying narratives of globalization and
homogeneity and can make particularisms and non-hegemonic processes visible.
But legal analysis should not only be aware of such flows, but also to the consequences of
such flows in specific spaces. Legal anthropology is based on the assumption that the
understanding and implementation of norms depend heavily on the spatiotemporal
context and its social practices. Trying to get a fuller picture of the living law, its
historical, spatial and social embeddedness, can contribute a great deal to legal analysis
by making hegemonies and counter-hegemonic processes visible. Theoretical concepts
like legal pluralism invite us to look beyond the law of the books and to consider other
social practices when contemplating the law.
“Other” knowledges of the law
Seeing the law as a social practice, which is a product of space, history and other social
practices, allows also for unmasking formations of power both within the law and society
as a whole. Examining law as a social practice includes exploring on the one hand its
relationship to other social practices, and, on the other hand, its own nature and content.
This includes the analysis of law’s structures, the identities it creates and the underlying
discourses that legitimize it.
Those structures, identities and discourses of social practices are reflective of social
hierarchies within the spatiotemporal context. In most Western countries, for instance, it
holds true that the majority of high ranking legal professionals continue to be white, non-
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working class, non-migrant, heterosexual and male. Limiting the legal analysis to the
“formal” law, and thereby privileging the perception of white, non-working class, non-
migrant, heterosexual men, leads not only to a failure to see a full picture of law as a
social practice, but also reinforces relations of power. While it is a first step in the right
direction to acknowledge that the legal consciousness of the population matters, it is
crucial to not stop there and to create further dichotomies and imbalances of power
between the seemingly objective and knowledgeable legal professional and the “funny
ideas” of ordinary people about the law. Hence, the Benda-Beckmanns make a very good
point when they argue that one should not only discuss the legal consciousness of the
population (or lack thereof), but also the situated legal consciousness of judges and other
legal professionals (p.137-8).
Making use of anthropological methods
Looking at the law of the books is not enough for getting a full picture of the law and legal
processes. In this regard, anthropological methods may be good tools for dismantling
hierarchies within the law, as well as law’s relationship to other social practices.
Anthropological methods are as diverse as they are in other disciplines. Despite
anthropology’s troublesome history, many anthropologists commit to a “humanist” or
transformative research approach, stressing the subjectivity of the researcher and
his*her research. Tools like “positionality” help to situate both the researcher and the
field of research. The work of anthropologists contributes much to critical approaches to
research and critical research methods.
Some anthropologists also challenge ideas like that of the “native informant” which also
plays a crucial role in international law, for instance, as an expert before international
courts or in international organizations. Especially discourse-centred anthropological
approaches may help to situate the knowledge of such “indigenous experts” and provide
meaningful insights for diversifying the voices to be included in research (p.418).
Conclusion
Many anthropologists and critical legal scholars have a similar world view and pursue
similar goals. So, no matter if one advocates for a post-, trans- or interdisciplinary
approach, law can certainly learn from anthropology. Legal science and practice can only
get better when people are willing to look beyond the confined boundaries of their
discipline. Acknowledging the situatedness of the law may help to overcome
homogenizing and hegemonic social practices. Law and legal science could be greatly
diversified by giving more space to “other”, marginalized perspectives. This could happen,
for instance, by using methods like participant observation, interviews or participatory
action research to grasp the views of people other than legal professionals. But legal
studies and research, as well as legal practice also need to become more accessible to
non-privileged groups. Legal anthropology could thus become a signpost towards a more
pluralistic transnational law.
 
Ricarda Roesch is currently a visiting researcher at the Kofi Annan Institute for Conflict
Transformation in Monrovia, Liberia. She holds a LL.B. from Hanse Law School and a LL.M.
from the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS, University of London, UK). Her PhD
at the Friedrich-Alexander-University of Erlangen-Nuremberg, Germany, is on
consultation rights of local communities with regard to land and natural resources in sub-
19/2/18, 5)46 pmLearning from Anthropology | Völkerrechtsblog
Page 4 of 5http://voelkerrechtsblog.org/learning-from-anthropology/
Saharan Africa and funded by the Heinrich Boell foundation.
 
Cite as: Ricarda Rösch, “Learning from Anthropology: Realizing a
Critical Race Approach to (International) Law”, Völkerrechtsblog,
19 February 2018, doi: 10.17176/20180219-174436.
ISSN 2510-2567
Tags: Anthropology of International Law , Global South , Postcolonialism , Race
Print Facebook 3 Twitter Email
No Comment
Leave a reply
Logged in as ajv2016. Log out?
SUBMIT COMMENT
 Notify me of follow-up comments by email.
 Notify me of new posts by email.
   
Related
We need to talk about 'race' On harm and history Towards a Constitutionalism of
the Wretched12 February, 2018
In "Critical Race Perspectives on
International Law"
8 April, 2015
In "Allegra - Transitional Justice" 27 July, 2017
In "Global South in Comparative
Constitutional Law"
PREVIOUS POST
Building Islam as a race in French
colonial law
#
NEXT POST
This is the most recent story.
19/2/18, 5)46 pmLearning from Anthropology | Völkerrechtsblog
Page 5 of 5http://voelkerrechtsblog.org/learning-from-anthropology/
Copyright © 2016 · | ISSN 2510-2567 | Impressum & Legal % ! &
